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Negligent Operation of a Police Vehicle
Harvey S. Morrison*
A S A GENERAL RULE a police officer on an emergency call is required
to exercise the care which a reasonable, prudent man would exer-
cise in the discharge of official duties of a like nature under like circum-
stances.1 Comparing this standard of care to that required of a civilian
driver, one finds not that a lesser degree of care is required of the police
officer but that the care exercised must be commensurate with the cir-
cumstances. The ordinary driver under ordinary circumstances uni-
formly has the duty to exercise ordinary care toward other travelers to
avoid injury or property damage.2 The police officer, however, due to
the exigencies of an emergency may take risks, particularly as to the
speed of travel, which, if undertaken by the ordinary driver, would
amount to negligence.
3
It has also been said that operators of emergency vehicles are bound
to exercise reasonable precautions against the extraordinary dangers of
the situation that the proper performance of their duties compels them
to create. When dealing with the operation of emergency vehicles, it is
important to recognize that "negligence" and "reasonable care" are
relative terms, and their application depends upon the situation of the
parties and the degree of care and vigilance which circumstances rea-
sonably impose. Negligence and reasonable care derive their only sig-
nificance from a factual background, and that background must contain
evidence of circumstances which justify a legitimate inference that in
the exercise of reasonable care and prudence injury could have been
avoided. 4
Under normal circumstances all operators of motor vehicles, whether
they are policemen or civilians, are bound to observe the laws established
for the operation of their vehicles. However, under special circumstances
"emergency vehicles" are excused from prima-facie speed limitations,
right-of-way, and other standards.5 Under the Ohio statute, which is
similar to that of other jurisdictions, the operator of the emergency
vehicle must sound an audible signal by bell, siren, or exhaust whistle,
and he is further admonished that exemption from speed limit require-
Of the Cleveland Bar.
1 Reynolds v. Hart, 26 Ohio L. Rep. 256, 6 Ohio L. Abs. 301 (1927).
2 Stoops v. The Youngstown Suburban Transportation Co., 121 Ohio St. 437, 169 N.E.
456 (1929).
3 McCarthy v. Mason, 132 Me. 347, 171 A. 256 (1934); Russell v. Nadeau, 139 Me. 286,
29 A.2d 916 (1943).
4 Montalto v. Fond du Lac County, 272 Wis. 552, 559, 76 N.W.2d 279, 283 (1956);
Torres v. City of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. 2d 35, 48, 372 P.2d 906, 914 (1962).
5 Ohio Rev. Code, § 451124 (1965).
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ments does not relieve him of the duty to drive with due regard for
the safety of all persons using the street or highway.
By way of comparison, the Pennnsylvania Vehicle Code6 provides
that "the speed limitations set forth . . . shall not apply to vehicles when
operated with due regard for safety, under the direction of police in the
chase or apprehension of violators of the law, or of persons charged with
or suspected of any such violation.. . . The exemption shall not, however,
protect the driver of any such vehicle from the consequences of a reck-
less disregard of the safety of others."
Applying law to facts and bearing in mind that the exemption
statute of Pennsylvania appears much broader on its face than that of
Ohio, it is found that the supreme courts of each jurisdiction have
reached the same result in similar fact situations. In 1964, the Ohio Su-
preme Court held that pacing a suspected law violator to determine
whether he is violating the speed law does not constitute "responding
to an emergency call" under the immunity provisions of The Ohio Re-
vised Code.7 In 1938, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that clock-
ing a speeding automobile is not such an emergency duty as to bring
the case within the exemption of the Traffic Code.s In the same year
the Court held that police officers in pursuit of felons in a stolen car
were immune from the speed restrictions, provided there was audible
warning and no reckless disregard for the safety of others.9
In 1938, the California Supreme Court set forth the rule which it
followed until 1962. In Lucas v. City of Los Angeles,'0 they held:
Our conclusions from the foregoing are that when the operator of
an emergency vehicle responding to an emergency call gives the
statutory notice of his approach the employer is not liable for in-
juries to another, unless the operator has made an arbitrary exer-
cise of these privileges. In such cases speed, right-of-way, and all
other "rules of the road" are out of the picture; the only questions
of fact, in so far as the public owner is concerned, are first, whether
there was an emergency call within the terms of the statute; sec-
ond, whether the statutory warning was given; and third, whether
there was an arbitrary exercise of these privileges.
This rule was followed until 1962, when the Court considered Torres v.
City of Los Angeles.1 1 The so-called "California rule" was discarded,
and the Court declared:
From the foregoing it is manifest that as to such conduct not
specifically exempt from the imposition of liability, the degree of
6 Pa. Stat. Ann., tit. 75, § 1002 (f) (1960).
7 Lingo v. Hoekstra, 176 Ohio St. 417, 200 N.E.2d 325 (1964).
8 Cavey v. City of Bethlehem, 331 Pa. 556, 1 A.2d 653 (1938).
9 Reilly v. Philadelphia, 328 Pa. 563, 195 A. 897 (1938).
10 10 Cal.2d 476, 486, 75 P.2d 599, 604 (1938).
11 Supra n. 4.
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care lawfully imposed upon the agents or the employees of a mu-
nicipality is that care consistent with the exercise of ordinary pru-
dence in all the prevailing circumstances, including those circum-
stances manifest at the time of an emergency call. The question to
be asked is what would a reasonably prudent emergency driver do
under all of the circumstances, including that of the emergency.
In no event, however, can a municipality justify an arbitrary exer-
cise of emergency privileges conferred by statute.
This view is in accord with decisions in Nevada, 12 Maine,' 3 Florida, 14
Kentucky, 15 Arizona,' 6 Texas17 , and New York"'.
The primary area of difficulty in discussing police liability under
emergency circumstances has as its center the term "emergency call."
Whether or not a police vehicle is responding to an emergency call has
been held to be a question to be determined by the jury.19 However, in
a recent Ohio decision, concerning the pacing of a speed violator by a
police officer, 20 the trial judge in his general charge to the jury instructed
that as a matter of law the defendant police officer was not "responding
to an emergency call." Following this trend, a trial court in deciding
a case of a police officer responding to a dispatch to investigate the re-
port of a discovered body,21 granted a directed verdict for the defendant
police officer. In essence the court ruled that as a matter of law such
circumstances fell within the area of "responding to an emergency call."
The courts have emphasized that in most situations, the police of-
ficer had, in fact, received a communication or dispatch requiring him to
take some affirmative action. In Bravata v. Russo,22 the New York Court
declared that the definition of "emergency call" as set forth in Coltman
v. City of Beverly Hills,23 to be a "sensible construction," and that an
emergency call exists when, on receipt of the message, the police car oc-
cupants truly believe that an emergency exists and have reasonable
grounds for such belief. If the meaning were otherwise, conscientious
policemen would be penalized for responding to a police function and
12 Johnson v. Brown, 75 Nev. 437, 442, 345 P.2d 754, 756 (1959).
13 Russell v. Nadeau, supra n. 3.
14 City of Miami v. Thigpen, 151 Fla. 800, 11 So.2d 300 (1942).
15 Henderson v. Watson, 262 S.W.2d 811 (Ky., 1953).
16 Ruth v. Rhodes, 66 Ariz. 129, 185 P.2d 304 (1947).
17 Grammier-Dismukes Co. v. Payton, 22 S.W.2d 544 (Tex., 1929).
18 Bravata v. Russo, 41 Misc.2d 376, 245 N.Y.S.2d 702 (Sup.Ct. 1963).
19 Livezey v. Rogers, 31 Cal.App.2d 412, 88 P.2d 169 (1938); Coltman v. City of Bev-
erly Hills, 40 Cal.App.2d 570, 105 P.2d 153 (1940); Torres v. City of Los Angeles,
supra n. 4.
20 Lingo v. Hoekstra, supra n. 7.
21 Spencer v. Heise, 107 OhioApp. 505, 158 N.E.2d 570 (1958).
22 Supra n. 18.
23 Supra n. 20.
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apathetic policemen rewarded for their abandonment of such function.
But in Lingo v. Hoekstra,24 the Ohio Supreme Court held:
The word "call" in the phrase, "emergency call" . . . refers not to
just a call in person or by a medium of communication from a citizen,
superior officer of the patrolman or police dispatcher, but rather a
"call to duty." However, the essential question here is: Was this "an
emergency call," that is, did it arise from such a dangerous situation
that it would excuse the defendant from being liable for his neg-
ligent conduct which resulted in injury to the plaintiff?
The Court held that a police officer who clocked a suspected speeder
through a red traffic control device and struck the plaintiff who was
lawfully proceeding through the intersection was not "responding to an
emergency call" so as to be immune from liability under Ohio law.
Thus, the police officer, and primarily the traffic enforcement officer,
is faced with a dilemma. He is under a duty to arrest and detain a per-
son found violating the law.2 5 He may, without a warrant, arrest a per-
son for a crime committed or attempted in his presence.20 On the other
hand, if he is involved in a motor vehicle accident while in the process
of making an arrest, he is subjected to the burden of trial, and in
several jurisdictions, the decision of a jury as to whether or not he is
"responding to an emergency call."
At common law, a police officer was not immune from liability in
motor vehicle accident cases, and in many jurisdictions he is presently
liable for injuries he inflicts in such situations. This doctrine was
applied although the municipal corporation which he served was im-
mune from liability under the doctrine of "sovereign immunity." 27 How-
ever, in recent years, various state legislatures have seen fit to protect
municipal law enforcement officers by grants of immunity or provision
for indemnification.
The legislatures of New York, Illinois, and Massachusetts, for ex-
ample, have enacted indemnification provisions into their statutes where-
by a city is required to indemnify its peace officers for expenses or dam-
ages incurred as a result of acts done by him as a police officer, in the
performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment. 2s
While the policeman remains liable to the injured party, the municipality
acts as an insurer or indemnitor in the event a judgment is rendered
against the officer.
24 Supra n. 7.
25 Ohio Rev. Code, § 2935.03 (1954); City of Columbus v. Holmes, 107 Ohio App. 391,
396 (1958).
26 N.Y. Code of Crim. Proc. § 177; see also Ill. Stat. Ann. ch. 38, § 107-2 (1962); Cal.
Pen. Code, § 836.
27 63 C.J.S., Mun. Corp. § 746 (1950); See also, Green, Freedom From Litigation, 38
Ill. L. Rev. 355 (1944).
28 N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law, § 50 (c); 24 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 24, §§ 1-4-5 (1962); Mass., Ann.
Laws, ch. 41, § 100 (1958).
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The approach taken by California is to grant immunity to its peace
officers operating emergency vehicles. Section 17004 of the Vehicle Code
provides:
A public employee is not liable for civil damages on account of per-
sonal injury to or death of any person or damage to property re-
sulting from the operation, in the line of duty of an authorized
emergency vehicle while responding to an emergency call or when
in the immediate pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the
law, or when responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm
or other emergency call.
An "authorized emergency vehicle" is defined as any publicly owned
vehicle operated by the following persons, agencies or organizations:
(2) Any police department, sheriff's department or California
Highway Patrol.29
The immunity provision was expanded in 1965 to cover all public em-
ployees under the circumstances set forth therein, and appears to cover
the situation where a traffic officer is in pursuit of a suspected speeder.
There is no distinction made between felonies and misdemeanors broad-
ening the old "emergency call" concept. Thus, a police officer can act
on his own initiative when duty calls, without having to wait for a dis-
patch.
The Ohio Revised Code does away with municipal immunity for
police operated emergency vehicles and presently provides limited police
immunity under the "emergency call" concept as set forth in Lingo v.
Hoekstra.30 Section 701.02 of the Revised Code provides:
Any municipal corporation shall be liable in damages for in-
jury or loss to persons or property and for death by wrongful act
caused by the negligence of its officers, agents or servants while
engaged in the operation of any vehicles upon the public highways
of this state, under the same rules and subject to the same limita-
tions as apply to private corporations for profit, but only when such
officer, agent or servant is engaged upon the business of the mu-
nicipal corporation.
The defense that the officer, agent or servant of the municipal
corporation was engaged in performing a governmental function,
shall be a full defense as to the negligence of:
(A) Members of the police department engaged in police duties;
(B) Members of the fire department while engaged in duty at a
fire, or while proceeding toward a place where a fire is in progress
or is believed to be in progress, or in answering any other emer-
gency alarm.
Firemen shall not be personally liable for damages for injury or
loss to persons or property and for death caused while engaged in
the operation of a motor vehicle in the performance of a govern-
mental function.
29 Cal. Veh. Code § 165.
30 Supra n. 7.
Sept., 1967
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Policemen shall not be personally liable for damages for in-
jury or loss to persons or property and for death caused while en-
gaged in the operation of a motor vehicle while responding to an
emergency call.
It should be noted that the police officer acting in the course of his duty
as a law enforcement officer will still be liable for injuries to individuals,
unless he was "responding to an emergency call." Thus it might be said
that the situation is one where the principal is free from liability for
the tort of its agent, even though the agent was acting within the scope
of his employment and was protecting the safety and general welfare of
the community.
To correct this situation and grant to individual officers under, emer-
gency circumstances same immunity enjoyed by the municipality, Hon.
David Headley of Akron, Ohio, introduced H. B. 221 on February 7,
1967, before the General Assembly of Ohio. This bill proposes to amend
Section 701.02 of the Revised Code by substituting the following language
for the last paragraph of the existing law:
Policemen shall not be personally liable for damages for injury or
loss to persons or property and for death caused while engaged in
the operation of a motor vehicle in the performance of a govern-
mental function.
It should be noted that the existing statute already gives firemen this
broader protection. However, this can be justified on the basis that a
police officer's normal duties require that he use the roads under normal
conditions, while a fireman's use of the roads is normally under emer-
gency conditions.
Reaction of police to Lingo v. Hoekstra3' has not been favorable.
The duties of the police officer are not easy. He is frequently poorly
paid, overworked, and unsupported by the general public. If he performs
his sworn duty to uphold the law and protect the community, he can
find himself susceptible to a civil suit, with the expense of legal fees and
possible adverse verdicts. The conscientious police officer is a profes-
sional public servant. While he assumes certain risks in his employ-
ment, he should not be forced to risk his income and property as an in-
cident to performance of his duties.
The writer concedes that opponents of H. B. 221 in Ohio, and of
similar legislation in other jurisdictions, can argue that the health,
safety, and general welfare of a community is more important than the
arrest of a traffic violator. However, when traffic violators become aware
that they will not be pursued, a general breakdown in observance of
traffic laws will naturally follow, to the detriment of the community in
general. Immunity from suit in motor vehicle cases is as important a
weapon in law enforcement as new scientific procedures, exotic com-
munications networks, and sophisticated firearms.
31 Ibid.
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